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Abstract
Employing case studies taken from work experience in the UK, USA, Canada and Japan this paper observes the evolution of 
Human Factors (HF) and ergonomics in the railroadfrom a practitioner’s point of view. Practical areas for application of HF at 
specific points in railroadsignaling and control systems are described. HF considerations in advanced train control systems and 
the movement towards automation are discussed as well as the impact of these new technologies on the context of operation
itself. There is now a greater reliance on the operator to remain vigilant and react efficiently when intervention on automation is 
required both within the control room and driver cab environments.  This paper illustrates some of the human performance 
concerns for novel transportation control systems that are faced todayand discusses how this area of cognitive attention, human 
error and workload is difficult to assess and predict.
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1. Introduction
A strong modern transportation system is a vital solution to the economic, environmental, and societal 
challengesfaced around the world today. As investment and expansion of public transportation increases, new train 
control technologies are introduced. Some of the new technologies are implemented for delivery of improved
operational performance, some for interoperability some for reputation but all ultimately for the purpose of safety. 
As the future public transit industry moves towards higher supervisory control systems to increase safety, the 
operator’s performance and reliability becomes ever more crucial. With the application of Human Factors (HF) and 
Ergonomics, the likelihood of human error can be significantly reduced if transit control systems are designed to be 
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intuitive and effective through iterative user centered design lifecycles. A holistic assessment approach is necessary 
to support the required human intervention points within any transit control system. 
2. Some observations on the evolution of Human Factors and Ergonomics in the railroad
In the UK,HF really became established in the railroad industry, as a result of an enquiry into the Ladbroke 
Grove rail crash in 1999. The incident report[1] identified that the signal passed at danger was due to the number of 
tasks the driver had to perform and the visual attention required controlling the train. As a result, the importance of
understanding the HF of train control design became recognized, such that UK rail infrastructure owners and 
operators now have mandatory HF integration standards[2][3] in place to demonstrate compliance with regulations. 
These include requirements for a Human Factors Integration Plan (HFIP) which is used to govern all the HF 
activities within a project and defines how the outcomes of the activities are linked into the overall project plans. 
These HFIPsare then evaluated by HF engineering departments that oversee project specific human factors 
engineering plans. These plans help to illustrate to project managers at what program milestones human factors 
specialists should be engaged and what deliverables for safety assurance would be expected. Of course this best 
practice approach is not always followed and all too often HF experts are only engaged following an incident 
involving human error where some failure has already occurred. This is often an expensive and ineffective way to 
manage HF in control system design.
In Europe the European Rail Agency has developedtechnical specifications for interoperabilityto ensure the 
interoperability of the European Community's high speed and conventional railroad systems. Sections of these 
technical specifications dictate layouts of driver machine interfaces incorporating some good HF design 
principles[4]. Regulation in other countries such as Thailand and South Africa evidence adoption of European 
control technologies and the associated standards.  For example, a metro project in Bangkok required HF support to 
endorse a new Japanese train design as fit for purpose for the client against UIC (FrenchInternational Union of 
Railways)standards[5]. 
In comparison, in North America HF seems to be a relatively unknown discipline, not yet actively regulated. 
Certainly light rail or metro rail system projects are not expected to engage HF experts to comply with regulations, 
although the American Public Transportation Association (APTA) has published some procurement guidelines for 
light rail vehicles that recommend car design shall take into considerationhuman factors engineering[6]. Only two 
guidance documents are currently registered with the American National Standards Institute [7][8]and prescribed in 
the Code of Federal Regulations for Positive Train Control Safety Plan (PTCSP) submissions[9].These are viewed 
by the industry as comprehensive specifications that present an arduous task for the designer in collating the 
evidence as well as a laborious task for review.  In a recent review of a Class 1 Railroad’s PTCSP submission it 
became evident that a level of interpretation is needed to determine what specifically should be included in a PTCSP 
HF analysis.
3. Human Factors applied in railroad control systems
There are a wide variety of types of train control and train protection systems in operation across the world, and 
therefore a broad array of user interfaces for both drivers and signalers alike. This paper discusses the HF 
considerations for: European Train Control System (ETCS) installed across Europe and the UK; Positive Train 
Control (PTC) mandated across the USA; and Communications Based Train Control (CBTC) in operation in high 
performance metro transit environments. These in cab signaling and wireless solutions require far less line-side 
equipment than conventional signaling systems, reducing costs associatedwith maintenance and repair from damage, 
theft or vandalism[10]. 
3.1. European Train Control System
Currently there is a drive across Europe and the UK toward interoperability: converting conventional 
signaledrailroads to European Rail Traffic Management Systems (ERTMS).  ETCS is the in-cab signaling and 
Automatic Train Protection (ATP) element that gives the train driver movement authority to proceed until the next 
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red signal.This drive toward interoperability, albeit a move in the right direction for familiar and consistent 
operational environments for drivers, creates driver interface concerns that need to be managed, particularly with 
respect to the integration with existing systems. ETCS has various application levels and the transitions between 
these levels of train control and their impact on workload need to be calculated.Additionally track side infrastructure 
needs to align concurrently with the onboard systems to ensure that there are no conflicts or confusion in the 
information displayed and the controls at the driver interface. The compatibility with other existing train protection 
systems also needs to be considered from a HF point of view. During the startup phase of the driver taking control of 
a train, data entry of the train parameters provides high potential for human errors and these needs to be managed 
effectively by early consideration of HF. The ETCS driving style is another key HF issue, where drivers need to 
maintain a ‘head up driving’ posture to observe any lineside signals in overlay areas or obstructions on the track 
ahead but at the same time monitor their speed and planning information on the in cab Driver Machine Interface 
(DMI). 
3.2. Positive Train Control
Whereas the main objective of the ERTMS is interoperability of trains across national borders, the main 
objective of USA’s North America’s PTC systems is to increase safety by enforcing movement authorities issued by 
pre-existing systemsthrough an independent, “overlay” function both under conventional signaling and in dark 
territory (devoid of dispatcher-controlled or automatic signals). The driver remains wholly responsible for operating 
within the movement authority, even if the enforcement function suffers a wrong-side failure. This means thata 
human performance factor plays a big part in the safe operation of the PTC system[10]. The fact that PTC is 
overlayed across other existing in-cab systems creates sub optimal cluttered operating environments, the lack of 
prescriptive regulation in terms of HF in PTC implementation as described earlier,and revisited later in this 
paper,are also concerns  with this implementation.
3.3. Communications Based Train Control
CBTC is a railroadsignaling system that makes use of the telecommunications between the train and track side
equipment for traffic management and infrastructure control. CBTCis used predominantly on metro systems to 
improve capacity and journey times while delivering required safety levels. A CBTC system is capable of 
implementingAutomatic Train Operation (ATO) modes and there are various levels ofthe grade of automation 
(GoA) applied. For example in GoAlevel 2, starting and stopping are automated but a driver in the cab starts the 
ATO, operates the doors, drives the train if needed and handles emergencies. In this GoA the driver is removed from 
the actual control process of the train.
3.4. Operational Train Control Points
There are a number of areas in the railroad industry where HF tools and techniques can be applied, such as in the 
design of trains, infrastructure and stations and in operational activities such as maintenance and control. Within 
railroadsignaling and control systems, HF is primarily focused on the driver’s cab and the user interfaces within the 
signalers’ control room.Typical areas of HFapplication at these pointsinclude:compiling hierarchical task analyses; 
the layout of controls in terms of the function, frequency and priority of use e.g. there may be some cases where 
high priority controls need to be located outside of the zone of convenient reach to encourage a deliberate action 
from the operator and avoid inadvertent activations such as changing modes between levels of automation;
andalarms management e.g. if alarms or alerts are designed poorly then people may have difficulty in detecting, 
understanding and responding to them appropriately. In recent history, contributory causes to major incidents in 
safety critical environments have been related to poor prioritization of alarms, where operators have chosen to 
ignore them due to alarm flooding or masking e.g. the BP Texas City plant explosion where the malfunction of 
alarm systems was a major factor.In cab audio alerts are vital if the driver is expected to maintain a head up driving
style, observing the track ahead and only responding to the control system when alerted accordingly. Glare is 
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another HF consideration given the move towards flat screen display technologies that are more reflective. 
Luminance emitted from these screens also needs to be assessed within dark tunnel environments or when operating 
at night, and rapid transitions between these environments.All of these issues can be addressed in new train cab 
builds at concept design stage but if new signaling control systems are retro-fitted to the trains then space constraints 
will dictate a lot of the positioning of equipment, causing sub-optimal HF performance. In a signal control room, 
where glare from windows is unavoidable, means should be provided to enable the impact to be minimized by the 
use of adjustable blinds or tinted glazing [11].In addition to workstation design, railroadsignaling control rooms tend 
to have large overview display (OVD) monitors installed. When using an OVD, the operator’s interpretation of 
system information is critical. Often, information from several displays must be coordinated by the operator in order 
to make a decision[12]. In GoA4 all responsibility for stopping trains in an emergency lies with the control room 
operators who are dependent on their CCTV and alarm systems to support their role, therefore an operators 
interpretation of system information is especially important. Therefore sequences of images and OVD layouts and 
any corresponding emergency stop plungers need to match a consistent pattern to ease recognition and response. 
4. Human Factors considerations for advanced train control systems
4.1. Automation
Innovations in information technology, driven by requirements for safer, more effective and efficient operations, 
have led to the increased use of automation, particularly in metro or High Speed Rail (HSR) environments. This in
turn amplifies the consequences of equipment and human failures within safety critical environments.With 
automation the job of the operator involves more monitoring of a steady state condition than in traditional less 
automated operations, but can at times be very demanding.For instance when abnormal situations arise and the 
operator is expected to operate using methods of manual intervention that are not frequently used and therefore the 
operator is less likely to be able to react appropriately and efficiently [13][14]. Workload can therefore go from one 
extreme of passive monitoring tasks to very stressful active tasks within a short time frame. The consequences of 
this can result in inappropriate operator action that can be potentially disastrous in driver’s cabs or control 
rooms.Depending on the GoA implemented, new skill requirements in perceptual judgment, decision making, 
problem solving and diagnosis will be expected. In particular GoA4, as discussed in section 3.4, places additional 
responsibility on the controller role. While under advanced train control systems routine operations can now proceed 
on the basis of automation, the worth of a control system will often rest on the ability of the operator to intervene 
successfully in response to special requirements such as a major incident [15].It is important that any automation 
provides a means for the operator to retain awareness of situations as they develop.  Therefore it is essential that 
designers work with the users of the automation to ensure that usersare informed about what the automated activities 
are and the basis for whythey are being undertaken, so that problems can be perceived and corrective actions can be 
made in a timely fashion. Transparency of the automated activities helps to build appropriate operator trust in 
system automation, for example in HSR driving controls where automatic braking systems are used[16].
4.2. Driver vigilance and distraction
Many recent concerns from the author’s clients are with issues of low workload, distraction and boredom,
particularly as operations become the subject of progressively increased automation. Upon upgrade from a GoA1 
system to a GoA2 driving train cab environment the driver tasks will change from control to monitoring activities 
with a focus on the platform train interface. This means a change in the driver’s mental model of the function of the 
control system. As a result where control systems rely on the supervision of a human operator, there is a reliance on 
the operator to remain vigilant and react efficiently when intervention on automation is required both within the 
control room and driver cab environments. For example a HF review of the train cab control layoutswill ensure that 
for ATOemergency controls are intuitively designed and easily accessible whilst not able to be inadvertently 
operated. Interventions such as alerters or vigilance devices are specified in some cases for train designs, but if the 
train control technology is far enough advanced that no human intervention is necessary to safely stop a train,for 
example in HSR operations, these may not be specifiedin a design. Strategies such as employingregular manual 
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driving and habitual emergency training on simulators can help prepare drivers’responses for instances in operation 
when they are unexpectedly required to override the automated control or otherwise manually intervene. In Japan 
alternative methods of vigilance are employed. The Tokaido Shinkasen drivers are expected to point at and 
annunciate all of their actions in the driver cab. A great deal of emphasis is placed on operating to timetable because 
of the frequent number of trains and very demanding high network capacity service they deliver. This operational 
culture means the mental vigilance and situational awareness of the driver is increased in a largely automated 
working environment because the operator is given active functions to perform. 
A concept that is currently undergoing research is to utilize adaptive automation strategies where during periods 
of physiologically detected low workload, the automation disengages and the human user engages in manual 
interactions. Conversely, during periods of high workload automation would be engagedto alleviate the human 
user’s workload, thereby providing additional benefits in balancing workload and maintaining the user’s situation 
awareness[17].
4.3. Context of operation
As systems are often designed without a good knowledge of the operational context they frequently present all 
possible information to the end user – the end user has to then decipher, extract and configure the information 
themselves as the situation demands [16]. This in turn increases the cognitive workload for the end user. For 
example, in the railroadenvironment DMI designers commonly provide drivers with gradient information, maximum 
allowed speed information, alerts about temporary speed restrictions ahead, overtaking trains or station stops ahead 
or suggested energy efficient speeds to travel to. An alternative approach would be to automatically assimilate this 
information and then simply presenting the driver with the speed the train should be driven at to arrive at the station 
on time.
It is not uncommon for trains to be procured from European designers for usein North America with often scant 
regard for whether the European design is fit for purpose in the North American operating environments. In these 
cases the client is often under the impression that, if the train itself has been ergonomically designed then no further 
consideration is needed, failing to identify that the train’s specific operating environment could dictate a change in 
tasks that deems the control layouts and cab designs as ill fitting. Another problem with procurement from Europe is 
that, like in the USA, new control functionality is often retrofitted to existing systems creating sub optimal and
cluttered operating environments. Unfortunately in some instances aesthetics and architecture can infringe on HF 
best practice. Depending on how project proposals are evaluated, ambiance and design beauty may score more 
highly than ease of operation or purpose of design. In other cases, especially with urban light rail control systems, 
some cities prefer not to see physical barriers for segregating railroads which could be seen to result in a tradeoff 
between aesthetics and safety but also at the same time encourages innovation in train control related infrastructure. 
HSR environments need very different operating considerations. For example in the author’s recent support of a 
HSR project focusing on Japanese train control technology it was observed that rigorous maintenance regimes, strict 
discipline, extensive procedural checks and behavioral techniques are used to avoid human error. In 
comparison,USA operations are not typically performed as rigorously or tend to be more paper checklist based. 
Another issue with high speed operations is that sightlines or emergency interventions become redundant as drivers 
would not humanly be able to react and stop in time even if they saw an obstruction on the track ahead. 
Requirements for drivers remaining vigilant and “in the loop” lose their significance here as there is not a lot they 
can do when limited by human capability. So for HSR complete reliance on automated braking systems is often 
encouraged. Some of the other cultural factors that can influence HSR operating environments and human 
performance include: driver shift lengths; organizational hierarchy; and training regimes. Therefore the
environmental culture for a system can significantly influence whether a design context is fit for purpose. 
5. Human performance concerns for novel transportation control systems
With the introduction of new train control systems existing operators may struggle with or resist the change in 
control techniques that are introduced. Depending on their level of understanding, drivers may experience a 
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fundamental change to their mental model of how the new control system works and a substantial learning curve 
would be required. This is shown in findings from PTC research in the USA [18] which indicates that train crews 
consistently reported that they needed to learn new train handling strategies to be able to stay within the PTC 
prescribed braking profiles as braking had to be initiated earlier than they were accustomed to. This change in 
mindset or shift in culture makes it important to understand and manage the human performance issues that are 
likely to arise.
5.1. Information processing and cognitive attention
Although notoriously difficult to assess, it is important to understand how humans process information because 
some driving situations may require rapid shifts of cognitive attention between tasks. This time sharing skill relies 
on the knowledge of the demands of the tasks e.g. whether some tasks are automated and therefore require less 
attention [19]. People have the capability for attending to different things, sometimes simultaneously;however 
fundamental limitations in attention constrain the capacities of these cognitive resources[16]. In pressurized 
situations human brains rely heavily on recognizing frequently seen patterns and make associations based on partial 
matching of incomplete information. This introduces a risk which could result in a human error if the response is not 
appropriate for the particular situation. The human’s natural tendency is to minimize cognitive effort which opens 
the door to a wide variety of shortcuts in unintentional decision making. When designing systems it is easy to 
overestimate human capabilities and underestimate the capacity for human error[16]. 
5.1.1. Cognitive attention and workload assessment
In the USA there are specific requirements for presenting assurance on Cognitive Task Analysis (CTA) which 
should be fed into the design of control systems when they aredeveloped. CTA is used to determine how the human 
conceptualizes tasks, recognizes critical information and patterns of cues, assesses situations, makes discriminations 
and uses strategies for solving problems, forming judgments and making decisions. Successful application of CTA 
in control system design depends on the assessor’s understanding of the cognitive processes underlying the human 
operations in the user tasks for the control system, and the constraints that the control system proposes on the human 
operator [16]. This means that a HF specialist needs to have a comprehensive understanding of the control system 
itself, the grade of automation, its safety integrity level, the location of, and timing required, for manual control 
intervention points, and its general operation across normal and degraded modes of operation. However the 
challenge at the outset is that often the control system product and concept of operations may not have been 
developed enough to understand what the operator critical decisions may be.Once the product design has evolved 
past a pilot state the information processing requirements of the user may already have been established. Therefore, 
a prediction of the scenarios of operations that will occur during the course of the train journey is necessary to start 
the analysis process, followed by an iterative user centered design process that evaluates if the design is fit for 
purpose for the user and iterates back to the design stage. Methods such as structured interviews of individuals and 
groups of operators and conductors, and field observations can be employed to help inform the scenarios. 
Analytical methods may be usedfor CTA to determine the number of tasks that must be performed, whether any 
simultaneous tasks must beperformed, the accuracy required by the task, and whether there are any constraints on 
the completion of the task, and how these would affect cognitive workload.This can be a tedious and laborious 
task.If a simulated or trial version of the control system under assessment does exist in operation then empirical 
methods such as workload assessment tools may be applied. A number of tools for the evaluation and prediction of 
mental workload exist[20]. Most of these methods fall into the three following categories:performance-based 
measures; subjective measures; and physiological measures[21]. 
In the railroadsubjective measures are adapted for use: Integrated Workload Scale (IWS) collects real time 
perceptions of signaler or driver workload based on a nine point scale considering the task, context and individual; 
Adapted Subjective Workload Assessment Technique (ASWAT), provides a relatively quick and easy general 
comparison scale for signalers to retrospectively assess threedimensions of workload: time load, mental effort and 
psychological stress load; NASA-TLX is a multi-dimensional rating procedure that derives an overall workload 
score based on a weighted average of ratings mental demands, physical demands, temporal demands, own 
performance, effort and frustration; and Instantaneous Self Assessment (ISA), is a technique that has been 
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developed as a measure of workload to provide immediate subjective ratings of work demands on a five point scale 
during the performance of primary work tasks. In practice the multidimensional complexity surrounding actual work 
situations and the uncertainty associated with the human’s goals, intentions, and attentional tasks can introduce 
many layers of guesswork: processing of performance failures; predicting human error; and identifying peaks and 
descents in cognitive load assessments[16].  
A crucial part of a holistic cognitive assessment isthe operating environments e.g. often train control products are 
integrated with other train management systems or sometimes other control systems that must also be considered for 
their impact on the cognitive loading of the driver. Environmental stressors such as sounding audible alarms can also 
add to cognitive loading. In one project the author led: in an effort to provide a barrier to error in one advanced train 
control project, alarms were not allowed to be silenced or quieted and would remain active throughout emergency 
recovery scenarios. Another important consideration is that with international HF work, language barriers become a 
real concern as subjective tools can often be influenced by an interpreters own agenda or simply in 
misunderstanding of what is being asked. Overall the reported use of CTA techniques is limited because: there are a 
limited number of practical applications of the CTA approaches available; a lot of time can be spent collecting, and 
analyzing the data which increases the cost of the work; and the limited availability of adequately qualified 
researchers to apply the techniques [22].
5.2. Factors of human error
When human errors do occur, too often the human is victimized by unforgiving stakeholders who are compelled 
to exact blame. Sometimes an array of design, organizational and situational factors may have lead to the behavior 
that results in an error. Kletz cites a number of real-world events showing how advanced digital control systems 
have failed in ways that proved cognitively challenging to operators, have not been well-matched to human 
capabilities, or have behaved strangely because of maintenance problems[22][24]. 
Personal factors can play a significant role in shaping error modes e.g. emotional state, risk attitude, and 
confidence in intuitive abilities. Personality traits such as a passive or submissive personality may be reluctant to 
interrupt, interrogate or question the information communicated to them, resulting in an incomplete and incorrect 
mental model of the problem. In contrast, over confidence can lead to risk-taking behaviors. Any factor that could 
disrupt a human’s ability to acquire or perceive relevant data concerning the elements in the environment, or 
compromise one's ability to understand the importance of that data and relate them to events that may be unfolding 
in the near future, can degrade situation awareness, e.g. humans are vulnerable to sleep deprivation and fatigue[16]. 
5.2.1. Human error assessment challenges
Often retrospective error analysis of incidents using error taxonomies for existing systems can be used to 
characterize the various ways that a particular task can be performed incorrectly and can be used to identify what 
went wrong. One issue encountered with this is many workers will be reluctant to report errors due to the threat of 
reprisals [16]. Although a common problem worldwide, this was particularly evident whilst working in Japan where 
reputation and integrity are highly regarded personal values. Reportedly in the Amagasaki rail crash in Japan (2005), 
the driver was so stressed about two earlier infractions that had to be justified, he chose to use the service brake, 
instead of the emergency brake at the time. Other practitioners have indicated that where reporting measures are 
employed, managers will play on technicalities to ensure the event is not recorded on their work site. 
Kirwan[25]notes that error reports are usually confined to the observable manifestations- external error modes, 
without knowledge of the underlying cognitive processes or psychological mechanisms which could compromise 
error reduction strategies. 
Retrospective analyses can be used to predict further potential for error, but to understand and predict errors for 
new systemsthe assessor needs to establish a detailed task analysis. This task in itself can be extremely challenging 
due to its tedious and time consuming nature. Other techniques used in error assessment such as walkthroughs, 
mock ups, simulations, interviews and direct observations also have their flaws in practical, commercially led 
industry settings where costs always affect ‘the bottom line’. Other human error assessment challenges include: user
walkthroughs that require user expert inputs from railroadsthat in some cases are not yet assigned or known; user 
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experts that are difficult to engage or may not even exist yet; design mock-ups can often be costly to implement; 
simulations that are often only introduced for training purposes at the end of the project; and interviews and direct 
observation that may be difficult to conduct if the control system is still only in its concept stage.Ultimately expert 
judgment remains a critical underlying aspect governing all of these human reliability assessment methods.
6. Conclusion
The integration of HF in the design of a work system, equipment, environment and tasks to support the user is 
critical to ensure that operators react efficiently and safely within tight timeframes.All of these concerns around 
automation, operation and human performance illustrate emphasize the importance of early engagement of qualified 
HF experts to identify the relevant human interactions, the human failure probability and the contextual factors and 
provide recommendations for design solutions in transportation control system projects. Not recognizing or fully 
accommodating human performance limitations within system design will effectively limit the overall performance 
of the system.Actively embeddingHF thinking and techniques into the existing processes and the safety culture can 
avoid errors affecting safety, and also those that impact upon service reliability and performance.
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